

### III. The Tongue and the Whetstone: Pindar, *Ol.* 6.82–83

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δόξαν ἔχω τιν' ἐπὶ γλώσσα ἀκόνας λιγυρᾶς,<sup>1</sup>  
ἃ μ' ἐθέλοντα προσέρπει καλλιρόοισι πνοαῖς.

The general construction is hardly in doubt, but the difficulty of the imagery is notorious.<sup>2</sup> Sandys' honest rendering makes this apparent:<sup>3</sup> "Methinks I have upon my tongue a whetstone shrill, that stealeth over me, nothing loth, with fair streams of inspiration." For a whetstone on the tongue must seem grotesque, but to have it steal over one, whether accompanied by fair streams of inspiration or not, is intolerable.

In mitigation it was pointed out by Gildersleeve, in his brief but valuable comment on the passage,<sup>4</sup> that "the tongue is freely handled in Greek," being sometimes a bow (*Isthm.* 4(5).47), sometimes a dart (*Nem.* 7.71). "Being a dart, it can be hammered, P. 1,86: *χάλκευε γλώσσαν*, or sharpened, as here. The trainer is a *Ναξία ἀκόνα*, I. 5(6), 73, and the poet's tongue is to be edged as the spirit of athletes is edged, O. 10(11), 22." And A. C. Pearson, in a

<sup>1</sup> Most modern editors transpose *ἀκόνας λιγυρᾶς* in order to avoid hiatus, perhaps rightly. But the case for transposition would be stronger if Pindar's MSS showed him less embarrassed by hiatus after the dative singular of the first and second declensions: cf. Bergk's note on *Ol.* 3.30.

<sup>2</sup> The late Gilbert Norwood declared that line 82 "has been more often debated by students of poetical diction than any other in Pindar": cf. *CP* 36 (1941) 394.

<sup>3</sup> Sir John Sandys, *The Odes of Pindar* (London and Cambridge, Mass. 1937) 63. Wilamowitz has a different rendering in *Philol. Untersuch.* 9 (1886) 167. He takes *δόξαν* as Pindar's belief in the story that he had, like Hagesias, *μάτρωες ἄνδρες* living in Stymphalus, inserts a comma after *γλώσσα*, removes another after *ἀκόνας*, and translates: "Ich habe eine sage auf der zunge, die kommt zu mir getragen von anmutigem hauche, und so willig ich schon selbst bin, schärft sie mir noch die zunge wie ein schriller wetzstein." But the punctuation evidently does violence to the lines, it is not explained why Pindar should have this, or any opinion, on his tongue, the reference of the relative pronoun is obscure, and the syntax of *ἀκόνας* is admittedly hard. Moreover, as Norwood pointed out (see note 2, above), *δόξαν . . . τιν'*, if interpreted in this way, is too tentative for Pindar. Wilamowitz did not return to this passage in his *Pindaros* (Berlin 1922).

<sup>4</sup> B. L. Gildersleeve, *Pindar: The Olympian and Pythian Odes* (New York, Cincinnati, and Chicago 1890) 179.

learned note,<sup>5</sup> has reinforced this point with many examples, notably Soph. *Aj.* 584:

γλῶσσά σου τεθηγμένη

and Trag. fr. adesp. 423 (Nauck<sup>2</sup>):

γλῶσσαν . . . ἡκονημένον,

and observes that "γλῶσσα was familiarly and freely associated and sometimes identified with a *sharp striking-instrument*."

This is useful and, indeed, necessary; but, although it can palliate, it cannot heal the trouble. The reason for this ought to be plain. Pindar does not state that there is a whetstone on his tongue. What he says is quite different: he has on his tongue a certain δόξα of a whetstone.

Now the meaning of δόξα (and δοκεῖν) is not adequately understood and a full investigation would require much more space than a study of this sort can provide. However, for our present purposes it suffices to follow Wilamowitz<sup>6</sup> in distinguishing two principal uses, "appearance" to oneself and "appearance" to others. But Pindar's language indicates that he has a δόξα *on his tongue*. If this is true, he must have something that "appears" to him and not to others. Hence "reputation" and "account" are excluded, on the ground that he cannot have on his tongue either what others think of him or a narrative told by others. Some such inference is evidently made by Sandys, who translates, "methinks," and by Professor Richmond Lattimore,<sup>7</sup> who renders, "*I believe* a stone upon my speech has honed it to fluency." Nevertheless, this cannot be quite right, since we do not hear of opinions, beliefs, or (for that matter) expectations that are formed on the tongue, and the words that follow are unsuited to the description of such a process; "fancy" is, in addition, disqualified by its un-Pindaric modesty. *Prima facie* it seems safest to say that he has a "perception" or a "feeling," for there is no difficulty in speaking of a tongue that perceives or feels. Moreover Gildersleeve speaks in his note of "the shrill whetstone that P. feels on his tongue," and consequently this inference is supported by his unrivalled authority.

This must be the kind of thing that Pindar means. But if he

<sup>5</sup> "Pindar, *Ol.* 6.82", CR 45 (1931) 210.

<sup>6</sup> U. v. Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Euripides: Herakles*<sup>2</sup> (Berlin 1895) 2.70.

<sup>7</sup> *The Odes of Pindar* (Chicago 1947) 18.

does, the nature of the whetstone becomes a problem again. We have seen that the figure of the sharp tongue is accepted in Greek as in English, and it may be elaborated with concrete detail in Greek poetry, as the examples make clear. But in all these passages γλώσσα is the utterance or the organ of utterance. In our text alone it is an organ of perception. We can read with pleasure *Pyth.* 1.86: ἀψευδέι δὲ πρὸς ἄκμονι χάλκευε γλώσσαν only if there is no suggestion that the tongue *feels* the hammer or the anvil. Granted that lingual acuity is permissible in metaphor, who will endure the *perception* of lingual exacuation?

In order to answer this question it will first be necessary to distinguish between two kinds of perception. First, there is perception of sensation, as when I say, "It seems to me that sugar is sweet on my tongue."<sup>8</sup> This meaning is evidently impossible in Pindar's line, as has been seen. Secondly, there is perception of a state of mind, as when I say, "It seems to me that I am glad at heart."<sup>9</sup> Here the word "heart," unlike "tongue" in the first example, is a metaphor for the seat of emotion. Pindar, it would appear, uses "tongue" in some such metaphorical sense, although he may have been even less conscious of the metaphor than we generally are in our use of "heart."

The organs of consciousness, such as the φρένες and θυμός, were originally also organs of the body, as we have been recently reminded by Professor R. B. Onians in an illuminating book.<sup>10</sup> Indeed, in the early Greek period mind and matter, soul and body, are only imperfectly and intermittently distinguished; this has been observed, for example, by critics of art as well as historians of philosophy.<sup>11</sup> Later, when such words had been given a more precise meaning, early texts containing them might easily be misinterpreted: in this way Aristotle (*Eth. Nic.* 1105A.7-9; *Pol.* 1315A.29-31) supposes that

<sup>8</sup> Cf. e.g. Eur. *Or.* 259:

ὁρᾷς γὰρ οὐδὲν ὧν δοκεῖς σάφ' εἶδέναι.

Here the sensation is clear vision and it seems to Orestes that he possesses it.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. e.g. Hdt. 2.93: ἐγὼ μοι δοκέω κατανοεῖν τοῦτο. Herodotus perceives his state of mind, viz. understanding.

<sup>10</sup> R. B. Onians, *The Origins of European Thought*<sup>2</sup> (Cambridge 1954). Onians is inclined sometimes to restrict the meaning of such words excessively, instead of allowing them to develop at least part of the way to becoming psychological terms: on this point, see the remarks of A. J. Festugière in *REG* 66 (1953) 396-406.

<sup>11</sup> W. K. C. Guthrie, *Greek Philosophy: The Hub and the Spokes* (Cambridge 1953) 8, who cites a similar comment, in a description of a terra-cotta head of the sixth century, made by Peter Quennell in his *Spring in Sicily* (London 1952) 107.

θυμός means "anger" in Heraclitus' famous dictum, θυμῷ μάχεσθαι χαλεπὸν (B 85 Diels<sup>6</sup>).<sup>12</sup> In the light of Pindar's usage in our passage it would be well to weigh the possibility that γλώσσα also had originally a richer meaning that included the utterance and the processes of consciousness that created it.<sup>13</sup> The ease of the transition from the one to the other is clearly shown by *Nem.* 4.7-8:

ὃ τι κε σὺν Χαρίτων τύχη  
γλώσσα φρενὸς ἐξέλοι βαθείας

and *Isthm.* 6(5).72 (6.68 Turyn):

γλώσσα δ' οὐκ ἔξω φρενῶν.

There are other indications in Pindar's use of the word that point to this conclusion. The action of the tongue implies, for example, an act of the will. Euripides' Hippolytus, who has known the blessings of an emancipated education, can disengage with perfect ease the utterance from the intention (*Hipp.* 612):

ἡ γλῶσσ' ὁμώμοχ', ἡ δὲ φρήν ἀνώμοτος.

And the Book of Common Prayer commands us to pray "with a pure heart" as well as a "humble voice." Pindar, however, appears to make no such distinction. The solemn pronouncement (*Ol.* 6.13) and the ardent prayer (*Pyth.* 3.2) are alike ἀπὸ γλώσσας: the phrase implies no discrepancy, as it does, e.g., in Aesch. *Agam.* 813, between words and truth. Tongue and mind ought both to be cultivated (*Pyth.* 5.110-11); if the one acts without the other, the result is, not insincerity or untruthfulness, but error and failure (*Isthm.* 6(5).71-72=6.67-68 Turyn). The tongue is not merely an instrument of the mind: it has a will of its own (*Ol.* 11.9).

This way of speaking seems strange to us, who are trained in the categories of a more abstract psychology. We do not ordinarily speak of the tongue as an independent agent, because we generally consider the self a unity having a number of faculties but only one

<sup>12</sup> Cf. H. Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy* (Baltimore 1935) 345. "It is hard to fight with one's heart's desire" is the translation given by J. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*<sup>4</sup> (London 1930) 140.

<sup>13</sup> The extended meaning is certain in *ἄγλωσσον* (of Ajax in *Nem.* 8.24). It is probable in the compound *εὐθύγλωσσος* (*Pyth.* 2.86), since "straightness" is more suited to the meaning of utterance than to the organ or the utterance itself. So Pindar uses the simple adjective of the *νόος* (*Pyth.* 3.28-29) and of *τόλμα* (*Ol.* 13.11-12) and Aeschylus has the compound *εὐθύφρων* (*Eum.* 1040).

will. Nevertheless we do say, "I spoke without thinking," which is our way of recognising that the tongue may speak without the prompting of reflection. Even so we preserve, in the subject, the unity of the self, whereas Pindar might have reported the same act by saying, "The tongue spoke without the *φρήν*."<sup>14</sup>

Pindar will therefore, because of his peculiar psychology, express himself in an unfamiliar way. But this way is, in fact, highly concrete and faithful to experience, and therefore in keeping with both the simplicity of Pindar's mind and the directness of his vision. In him these qualities were allied with poetic genius, but it will be sufficient for our purpose to point to similar modes of thought in cases where this is not present, in fact in children and primitive peoples.

Onians gives, with other examples, this charming incident:<sup>15</sup> "When my little nephew, F. R. S. (three years, five months), after making a statement, was asked 'How do you know?' he used to reply 'With my tongue.'" Even closer to Pindar's words is the statement of a Kirghiz minstrel, reported by F. M. Cornford:<sup>16</sup> "I can sing any song whatever; for God has implanted this gift of song in my heart. *He gives me the word on my tongue, without my having to seek it.*"

It is perhaps now safe to conclude that in Pindar the tongue is not merely the member of the body, nor the organ of the mind, nor (by metaphor) the utterance itself: it is both the member and all its powers,<sup>17</sup> comprising the formation, the enunciation, and the effect of speech. The tongue can, in metaphor, be forged or sharpened, it can fire its arrows as from a bow, it can fall, with full effect, upon the

<sup>14</sup> On the connection of tongue and *φρήν*, cf. *Nem.* 4.7-8, *Isthm.* 6(5).72 = 6.68 Turyn (both quoted on 34, above), and, by implication, *Ol.* 2.90 = 99 Turyn. So the *φρήν* itself may cry out: *Pyth.* 6.35-36. In a striking passage Theognis (1163-64) declares that eyes, tongue, ears, and *νόος* grow *ἐν μέσσω στήθεων* in the case of men of understanding; the connection of tongue and chest (including the *φρήν*) is necessary for understanding. Cf. also Aesch. *Suppl.* 775:

*εὐθυγλώσσω φρενί.*

On the implication, for Homer, of understanding in words, cf. the remarks of F. Solmsen in *TAPA* 85 (1954) 2.

<sup>15</sup> *Origins*<sup>2</sup> (see note 10) 14, note 1. My own nephew, J. A. B., aged three years and two months, upon being asked why he was unable to read, replied, "I can't read yet because my mouth isn't big enough."

<sup>16</sup> *Principium Sapientiae* (Cambridge 1952) 101.

<sup>17</sup> In early Greek thought powers and qualities are not clearly distinguished from substances: cf. F. M. Cornford in *CQ* 24 (1930) 84.

hearer.<sup>18</sup> And in all its actions, the tongue, like the heart, can be its own percipient. We say, readily enough, of something that is on the point of being recalled from the memory, "I have it on the tip of my tongue." Pindar and no doubt other Greeks as well said that they felt on their tongues, as the Kirghiz minstrel felt, the power of words beginning to flow.

The image of the tongue that perceives is then, no doubt, a commonplace in Pindar's judgment, like our similar use of the heart. In consequence, it is not, from the poet's point of view, a metaphor at all, being a creature of the fancy rather than the imagination (to use Coleridge's convenient distinction). It follows that there can be no mixing of metaphors here. Pindar's poetic imagination contemplates only one image, the sharpening of utterance by the whetstone, and this combines smoothly with an expression taken from everyday usage. We, for our parts, should feel no jar in "the heart feels the spur of ambition."

This fact may explain Sappho, fr. 31.9:

ἀλλὰ καὶ μὲν γλῶσσα ἔαγε,

of which Professor Denys Page writes in his recent commentary:<sup>19</sup> "But Sappho's *tongue* is not in fact *destroyed*: we should have to suppose that she has said 'my *organ* of speech is destroyed' when she meant 'my *power* of speech is destroyed.'" As Page notes, Lucretius' *infringi linguam* (3.155) indicates that his text had ἔαγε. It seems likely therefore that for Sappho γλῶσσα comprised both meanings. This is borne out by fr. 137.5:

καὶ μὴ τί τ' εἶπην γλῶσσ' ἐκύκα κάκον,

in regard to which Page (105) comments on the unusual metaphor in the verb ("stirring" or "concocting"): the metaphor is in place if γλῶσσα is allowed the extended meaning. Moreover, it seems probable that the explanation of the puzzling phrases, βούς ἐπὶ γλώσση and κλῆς ἐπὶ γλώσση,<sup>20</sup> may begin with this interpretation of γλῶσσα also. These are grotesque only if the meaning is restricted to the physical member, whereas the metaphors in βούς and κλῆς, if applied to the mental aspect of γλῶσσα, are explicable on the analogy of the ἀκόνα in Pindar.

<sup>18</sup> See the passages quoted by Pearson in *CR* 45 (1931) 210.

<sup>19</sup> D. Page, *Sappho and Alcaeus* (Oxford 1955) 24.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. E. Fraenkel, *Aeschylus: Agamemnon* (Oxford 1950) 2.23 for the passages.

Next, the phrase *ἀκόντας λιγυράς* needs comment. *λιγύς* and *λιγυρός* are used of the sound of winds, whips, and bow-strings, so that it is convenient to translate them with "shrill."<sup>21</sup> However, the translation cannot be exact, as the words are regularly used of the *pleasing* sound of words and music:<sup>22</sup> they serve, indeed, as standing epithets for the Muse herself.<sup>23</sup> An unknown Peripatetic, whose treatise on sounds is included in the Aristotelian corpus, gives the meaning:<sup>24</sup> "Voices which are thin and compressed are *λιγυραί*, as in the case of the grasshopper, the locust and the nightingale, and speaking generally those which being light are followed by no other sound. As a general rule *τὸ λιγυρόν* neither depends on the swelling of the voice nor on relaxed and heavy tones, nor on the succession of sounds but rather upon sharpness, thinness, and distinctness."

The high, clear note was evidently admired and regarded as especially musical and poetic.<sup>25</sup> If it is here used of the whetstone, we must expect some conceit or oxymoron.<sup>26</sup> That such a figure is indeed present was recognised by the late Gilbert Norwood,<sup>27</sup> who

<sup>21</sup> Hom. *Il.* 23.215; *Od.* 4.567; *Il.* 11.532; Bacchyl. 5.73.

<sup>22</sup> Hom. *Od.* 10.254; 12.44; *Hom. Hym.* 19.19; Theogn. 939. Nestor is said (*Il.* 1.247–48) to be *ἥδυεπής* and *λιγύς* Πυλίων *ἀγορητής*. This use alone is enough to refute the view of the scholiast on our passage that, since the disorderly Thersites is called *λιγύς* . . . *ἀγορητής* (*Il.* 2.246), the epithet cannot have a pleasant connotation. But in addition the context of the latter passage shows that Thersites' eloquence is conceded, though his reckless words are denounced. Hence, Thersites' voice, though *ὄξυς* (2.22) as well as *λιγύς*, was not displeasing nor ineffective. The Greeks evidently liked clear, crisp, ringing sounds in music, recitation, or more commonplace activities, and for that reason they were willing to use of music words that are proper to the sound of clanging or crackling. For example, Pindar (fr. 192.34 Turyn = 124.34 Bowra) calls lyres *λιγυσφάραγοι*, and Bacchylides (2.12) uses *γλυκεῖαν αὐλῶν καταχάν* "to describe the brisk, high-pitched notes of flutes" (Jebb on 13.12–16).

<sup>23</sup> Terpander fr. 4.1; Alcman fr. 7; Stesich. fr. 16 and 18 (Diehl<sup>2</sup>).

<sup>24</sup> [Arist.] *De aud.* 804A.21–28. The translation is based on that of W. S. Hett in the Loeb edition.

<sup>25</sup> See the useful discussion by W. B. Stanford in *Hermathena* 61 (1943) 16–18.

<sup>26</sup> The sound made by the use of the whetstone is presumably harsh (cf. perhaps Hermippus fr. 46.5, 1.237 Kock: *ἀκόνη σκληρῆ*), like that of the file on iron ([Arist.] *De aud.* 802B.39–803A.3) or the sharpening of a saw ([Arist.] *Probl.* 886B.10). This is quite different from the sound indicated by Pindar's *λιγυράς*. Pseudo-Aristotle (*De aud.* 803A.6–7) has a convenient distinction in regard to the voice: *ἡ μὲν γὰρ ταχυτῆς τοῦ πνεύματος ποιεῖ τὴν φωνὴν ὀξεῖαν, ἡ δὲ βία σκληράν*.

<sup>27</sup> *CP* 36 (1941) 396. Norwood also noticed the distinction made above between the two kinds of perception. However, he thought (395) the second type, if combined with a metaphor, to be un-Greek, on the ground that the feeling "does not in fact exist at all but is untruthfully alleged in order to express a quite different truth." For this reason he preferred to take *γλῶσσα* as a metaphor (or metonymy) in addition to *ἀκονάς*, and translated: "In addition to my power of song, I have high repute as a trainer of

called *λιγυρᾶς* "a corrective epithet" and compared *εὐκλέας οὔστους* (*Ol.* 2.90), where "the adjective corrects or adjusts the normal meaning of the noun — 'arrows that confer, not death, but immortality.'" Hence, we may add, the poet's arrows are sweet (*Ol.* 9.11) and speak to the wise (*Ol.* 2.85 = 2.93 Turyn), and the poem that he offers to Aeacus is a Lydian crown, but one that is worked with ringing songs (*Nem.* 8.15):

Λυδῖαν μίτραν καναχῆδ' ἀ πεποικιλμέναν.

Even more apposite is the parallel of *Ol.* 9.47 (9.51 Turyn):

ἔγειρ' ἐπέων σφιν οἶμον λιγύν,<sup>28</sup>

in which we have the same epithet used with a metaphor to the same effect as in our passage.<sup>29</sup>

When line 82 is thus understood, the next verse is easy to interpret. First, the relative pronoun refers to the emphatic *δόξαν*, as rhythm and sense suggest. Next, the meaning of *προσέρπει* requires study.<sup>30</sup> The simple verb is often used of the movement of forces

others in music." But the double metaphor seems excessively artificial for Pindar; and, if it be granted that *δόξα* may signify the perception of a state of mind, there seems to be no great difficulty in describing that state by a not uncommon metaphor. Cf. *Hom. Od.* 10.415–17:

δόκησε δ' ἄρα σφίσι θυμὸς  
ὥς ἔμεν ὡς εἰ πατρίδ' ἰκοίαιο καὶ πόλιν αὐτὴν  
τρηχέλης Ἰθάκης, ἵνα τ' ἔτραφεν ἡδ' ἐγένοντο.

<sup>28</sup> This is the reading of the MSS, and it is supported by *Hom. Hym. Merc.* 451 (*οἶμος αἰοδῆς*) and the parallel of *οἶμη*: cf. also O. Becker, *Das Bild des Weges in Hermes Einzelschr.* Hft. 4 (Berlin 1937) 69. However, objection has been made to *ἔγειρ' . . . οἶμον* and Gedike's conjecture *οὔρον* is sometimes accepted, presumably in order to meet this objection, on the analogy of *Pyth.* 4.3 and *Nem.* 6.28. But a "path of songs" may be roused in Pindar, for the good reason that it is in the mind. This is made clear by the analogy of *Ol.* 7.45–47, where *forgetfulness* is said to come upon men and to divert the *πραγμάτων ὁρθὰν ὁδὸν* from the mind. Similarly, it is said at *Isthm.* 6(5).72 (6.68 Turyn) of the apposite speaker,

γλῶσσα δ' οὐκ ἔξω φρενῶν,

and the tongue is aroused in Cratinus (fr. 38.25 in Page's vol. 3 of the *LCL Select Papyri*).

<sup>29</sup> Similarly Bacchylides (9.10) has *λιγύφθογγον μέλισσαν*.

<sup>30</sup> The variant *προσέλκει* has some support in the MSS and scholia. It preserves the contrast with *ἐθέλοντα* and, perhaps, suggests the constraining power of a charm, for which the simple verb is used by Pindar (*Nem.* 4.35). However, it is less well attested than *προσέρπει* and we are not told how it is appropriate to the breath of inspiration. The prefix also causes some difficulty, for it seems suitable only if it governs *καλλιρδοῖσι πνοαῖς*; but then these words must refer, though obscurely, to the music of the performance and the connection with the whetstone and the tongue becomes tenuous. This difficulty in turn leads to various alterations in the text and punctuation of the line.



that affect man but are not under his control. It describes the progress of the *δαίμων γενέθλιος* (*Ol.* 13.105=13.101 Turyn), the advance of time (*Nem.* 4.43, 7.67–68, *Paeans* 2.26–27), the unsuspected onset of disaster (*Soph. Ant.* 618), the growth of the vine (*Soph.* fr. 255.3 Pearson), the advance of youth (*Soph. Trach.* 547). Pindar uses it twice in connection with poetry: in *Isthm.* 4(3).44 (= 58 Turyn) it describes the movement far and wide of the poet's immortal utterance; and in fr. 86 Turyn (= 61 Bowra).1–2, the flow of song from the lips of men. The word is appropriate in this context also,<sup>31</sup> for poetry is divine. Similarly, in our passage, *προσέρπει* is properly used of the approach (cf. *Nem.* 7.68 and *Soph. Trach.* 547) of inspiration. The breath that he feels upon his tongue is fluent and beautiful,<sup>32</sup> so that he welcomes it; but it is in the end a power that cannot be resisted. It is a *χάρις*, but a *χάρις βίαιος* as well.

Elsewhere Pindar prays that he may find words (*Ol.* 9.80 = 9.86 Turyn), or he stands poised, drawing breath before speaking (*Nem.* 8.19).<sup>33</sup> And it is a commonplace that the Muses pour sweetness on the tongue of the poet or orator and that from his lips in turn pour persuasive or enchanting words.<sup>34</sup> In our passage Pindar begins to feel on his tongue the infusion of the divine breath, which will sharpen his utterance; he receives it gladly as it comes over him, but it comes in power as well as beauty.

From all this it seems evident that *προσέλκει* really makes the task of interpretation harder: and one guesses that it is an emendation made when the psychology of the passage had become unfamiliar and the original text unintelligible.

<sup>31</sup> The examples given seem sufficient to establish the connotation, but the word would repay further study.

<sup>32</sup> For the streams of song, cf. *Isthm.* 6(7).19 and *Nem.* 7.12; for its breath, *Pyth.* 4.11. Cf. also Onians, *Origins*<sup>2</sup> 56: "it is not only emotion that the gods 'breathe' into men but also thoughts, devices, relatively intellectual." The scholiasts, who rationalise *δόξαν* into *δόκησιν*, have then no place for "breath" in the psychology of the passage and consequently have recourse to the breath of flutes.

<sup>33</sup> In another passage (*Nem.* 3.9) Pindar prays that the Muse grant him an abundance of song *μήτις ἀμᾶς ἔπο.*

<sup>34</sup> Cf. e.g. Hes. *Theog.* 83–84 and Pind. *Paeans* 6.43–44 Turyn (6.58–59 Bowra). Plato (*Rep.* 8.563c) has: οὐκοῦν κατ' Αἰσχύλον (fr. 351 Nauck<sup>2</sup>), ἔφη, ἐροῦμεν ὃ τι νῦν ἦλθ' ἐπὶ στόμα;